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Abstract 
By building upon critical debates on ‘network governance’ in policy-making, while 
finding complementarities with debates on corporate social responsibility in Mexican 
mining, the paper argues that in the (mis)management of information and 
implementation of participatory mechanisms, ‘administrative domination’ is found 
through the relationships held between government authorities and the mining 
corporation. Based on Cananea and the Sonora River Region, Gramscian 
understandings of hegemony are discussed. However, this approach faces 
limitations when encountering decentered relations that go beyond state actors. 
Therefore, Foucauldian debates on governmentality are useful to complement 







For centuries, Mexico has been known for its mining industry.  However, since the 
new millennium, mining production and its accompanying technologies has achieved 
unprecedented records. Sariego (2016:27) argues that between 2000 and 2016 the 
amount of gold extracted doubled that extracted between 1521 and 1830, while 
silver extraction was 60% higher in the same period. In 2013 a series of reforms 
intensified natural resource extraction in Mexico. Although these reforms pertain 
mostly to the energy sector, such as oil, hydrocarbons and renewable energies, 
during this same period, minor reforms to mining regulation were carried out to 
streamline the issuing of concessions and to prolong contracts with corporations for 
up to 50 years. These new changes are commonly known as the expansion of the 
mining frontier. 
Extraction of resources has undoubtedly been accompanied by conflict. Many 
debates in the Latin American context (Bebbington et al., 2008; Svampa, 2018; 
Vetlmeyer and Petras, 2014) have centered on the political economy of resources 
and communities’ struggle to defend life-styles threatened by the expansion of the 
industry. Fewer cases, however,  have focused on policy-making and on the role of 
government actors in forging spaces of participation to reduce levels of conflict when 
problems of institutional capacity and limited landscapes of regulations exist 
(Bebbington et al., 2019; Coelho and Favareto, 2008; Zaremberg and Torres Wong, 
2018).  The focus on participatory mechanisms is relevant as a generation ago it was 
considered key for democratizing Mexico. In particular, local governance 
arrangements, alongside decentralization, were considered potential ways to 
consolidate democracy (Grindle, 2007; Meza, 2018).  
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By building upon critical approaches to ‘network governance’ in policy-making, while 
finding complementarities with debates on corporate social responsibility in Mexican 
mining, the paper argues that in the (mis)management of information and 
implementation of participatory mechanisms, ‘administrative domination’ is found 
through the relationships held between government authorities and the mining 
corporation. This domination is achieved by a threefold strategy: (i) the corporation’s 
distancing from policy responsibility, (ii) legitimacy through control and (iii) the 
concealment of coercive tactics. The argument is based on a Gramscian 
understanding of hegemony in the governance of place. However, this approach 
faces limitations when encountering decentered relations that go beyond the state; 
therefore, Foucauldian debates on governmentality are useful to complement 
understandings on the nature and exercise of power relations in existing governing 
arrangements. In using Gramsci’s hegemony and Foucault’s governmentality it is 
possible to unravel everyday practices carried out by state and non-state actors, 
while also reframing my analysis into the importance of historicity and scale.  
 
The argument focuses on data collected from Cananea Municipality and the Sonora 
River region.[1] These areas have been impacted by a well-established mining 
industry, responding to global market forces such as commodity exports and their 
financialization as well as to transnational discourses of sustainable mining.  Both 
represent a conjunctural space in which labor, environmental and cultural-identity 
conflicts converge. According to Tetreault (2019), the confluence of these types of 
conflicts are the archetype for understanding resistance against mining in Mexico 
and Latin America, and I will also add, for understanding local governance given the 
myriad relationships existing between multi-faceted actors in state, business and civil 
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society spheres.  Fieldwork was carried out between August and November 2018; 
data collection included observations of everyday living over a three-week period 
and 39 in-depth interviews.[2] These were complemented by a documentary review 
which included policy reports, mining union bulletins, local newspaper articles, and 
human rights NGO reports. Thematic analysis was followed in the coding of the 
interview transcripts, fieldwork diaries and documents. Coding focused on repetitive 
practices and links to concepts related to governance, participation and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), all of which fed into broader analysis of the coercion-
consensus dialectics under Gramscian hegemony.  
First, the paper describes a series of recent historical events that help to 
contextualize local governance in Cananea and the Sonora River Region. The 
second section discusses the significance of a Gramscian approach in analyzing 
mining in these regions and the complementarities with Foucault’s governmentality. 
The next section explains how debates on network governance are articulated with 
CSR as a way of introducing administrative domination in mining towns; with 
empirical data the fourth and fifth sections unpack practices of administrative 
domination, which culminate in the threefold strategy. Finally, conclusions are 
presented, underlining the policy relevance of the framework developed.   
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Framing Cananea and the Sonora River Region 
Cananea is a north-western town located in Sonora State, 60 km  from Arizona, in 
the United States. In 2015, it had a population of 35,892 inhabitants (INEGI, 2015). 
Cananea has been a mining copper town par excellence since colonial times. It is 
seat of Buenavista del Cobre (BdC) Mine owned by Grupo Mexico Corporation 
(GpMx); it is the biggest mine in the country, the fourth largest copper mine in the 
world and unsurprisingly, the corporation is owned by one of the four richest men in 
Mexico. Cananea is also renowned for its labor struggles, the most relevant strikes 
being the 1906 insurrection of mining workers against precarious wages and long 
working hours and the 2007 strike led by Branch 65 of the Sindicato Nacional de 
Trabajadores Mineros, Metalúrigocs, Siderúrgicos y Similares de la República 
Mexicana (National Union of Mining, Metallurgic, Steel and Similar Workers of the 
Mexican Republic, SNTMMSSRM). The latter strike resulted from neoliberal 
economic policies that promoted the privatization of state-owned enterprises, 
alongside changes in labor contracts and working conditions that undermined many 
of the benefits that the SNTMMSSRM enjoyed during the nationalization period. The 
fatal accident in 2006, where 65 workers died in the Pasta de Conchos Mine in 
Coahuila State, also owned by GpMx, prompted Branch 65 to strike as workers in 
BdC experienced similar precarious working conditions.  
 
The 2007 strike is significant as it has contributed to shaping both the power 
relationships in Cananea and contemporary national labor and development policies 
(for a preamble see Sariego, 2013). Nearly 650 workers (Soy Cobre, 2018) and their 
families are still affected by the strike as they cannot be redeployed in the regional 
mining sector. The lack of formal and well-paid jobs has jeopardized these families’ 
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access to home ownership, which was a condition that was comfortably afforded in 
the early-1980s.  Decreased quality of public health provision, access to potable 
water and household waste collection are residents’ everyday concerns.   These 
services have gradually been neglected by local government authorities as they 
struggle to build capacity to absorb responsibilities that were once those of the mine 
when it was a state-owned enterprise (Sariego, 2013).  
 
The 2007 strike was an event that has permeated people’s memories regardless of 
their background and social class. However, for the workers still affiliated to Branch 
65, the strike has been a 12-year process of endurance and solidarity; whereas for 
other residents the strike finished in 2010, when the mine reopened its operations 
after a three-year closure and subcontracted labor through its network of suppliers. 
The effects of the strike are surprisingly present in the town’s urban space and street 
layout.  The strike started with violent protests along the main street, Benito Juárez, 
which in its heyday was remembered as a street full of life with pedestrians, local 
shops, the town’s hospital and a local school, and most importantly the activity of 
mining lorries going in and out the mine’s main entrance, known as ‘Gate 1’.  
Nowadays, this part of town, known as Cananea Vieja, feels like a ghost town, with 
empty streets and derelict buildings. Efforts to gentrify the historic area have been 
limited despite many buildings from the early-1900s preserving Cananea’s 
architectural style. The premises owned by Branch 65 (funerary premises, 
auditorium, among others), also located in this quarter, are also run down. Over the 
last decade, local shops have moved northwards around the main plaza and further 




The long labor struggle overlapped with the 2014 mining spill that originated from the 
negligent maintenance of the BdC tailings dam. Although the spill did not impact 
Cananea physically, it impacted its local as well as the regional governance of the 
Sonora River. The accident leaked 40 million liters of acidulant copper into the 400 
km-long Sonora River, which travels from the mountainous region of Sonora down to 
the valley of Hermosillo City, the state’s capital city. The volume and toxicity of the 
spill was categorized by the then Minister of Environment as ‘the worst mining 
accident in Mexican history’. Authority reports [3] indicate that in the first few months, 
the environmental damage impacted the water quality of the river, which provides 
water to a population of approximately 22,000 inhabitants dispersed throughout the 
seven municipalities along the river, and one of the two dams providing water to 
Hermosillo.  Acidulant copper and other heavy metals affected the crops and 
livestock of peasants and ranchers farming near the river. The accident was followed 
by an economic recession in the region. Although the Federal Attorney for 
Environment Protection (Environmental Auditing officer_035, Mexico City) and the 
state-level government Ministry of Economy (Direction of Mining officer_034, 
Hermosillo) confirmed that water levels are not contaminated, four years later, health 
problems continue to be  reported by academic investigations and human rights 
NGOs (PODER, 2018). These reports unveil the levels of anxiety, uncertainty and 
fear of the environment in which people live.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the disaster was identified as an opportunity for Branch 65 to seek 
allies from the communities affected. A short-lived alliance was made with 
environmental mobilizations existing in Hermosillo, who after the disaster formed the 
Frente de Defensa Río Sonora (Defense Front Rio Sonora, FDRS). The Branch 65-
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FDRS alliance was seen in street protests and sit-ins that took place in Cananea 
immediately after the spill, particularly outside Los Patos, the main water-well that 
pumps water to BdC (SNTMMSSRM, 2015). The nascency of a ‘movement against 
Grupo Mexico’ was mentioned in public speeches aiming to tackle environmental, 
labor and human rights abuses. Sit-ins outside Los Patos lasted three months, until 
federal police arrived to remove protestors. State repression was not reported in the 
news, but in fieldwork conversations, we were told that Branch 65 members were 
armed with sticks and knives in case confrontation with authorities turned violent, 
while committing acts of vandalism against GpMx’s property. This type of 
disobedience discouraged some residents from the lowlands who were not used to 
confronting state authorities through (armed) struggle and party politics.  
 
The appetite to mobilize by those residents who did not want to join Branch 65 
began with the building of relationships with Project on Organizing, Development, 
Education and Research (PODER), an international NGO aiming to improve 
corporate transparency and responsibility through a human rights perspective. 
PODER has offered an alternative that materialized in a long-term socio-legal 
strategy against GpMx and government authorities who turned a blind eye to the 
negligence and irregularities followed by BdC.  Since 2014, PODER has worked 
closely with the affected communities to raise 15 constitutional injunctions 
(amparos); some have reached the National Supreme Court of Justice against a 
wide range of government authorities (from environmental, health, agrarian 
ministries and respective regulators to municipal councils) and GpMx. In two of these 
claims the court ruling has favored the communities; the first in 2015 which 
recognized that water wells were contaminated and GpMx had to provide water-plant 
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treatments as part of its remedial plan, and the second published in 2018, 
establishing that all business corporations which have a direct impact on the 
environment have to consult local communities, indigenous or not, in their 
infrastructure plans.[4] In informing, training and mentoring communities on how to 
prepare and submit legal claims, PODER encouraged residents to organize in citizen 
committees, named Comités de Cuenca Río Sonora (Sonora River Basin 
Committees, CCRS). CCRS have been creating a sub-regional front that has 
gradually excluded Cananea and its historical labor movement (PODER officers_ 
009 and 038; Hermosillo and Mexico City).  
 
Cananea residents, especially former mining workers, are aware of small 
environmental accidents BdC has had in the past, but their small scale and the 
capacity of the mine to neutralize their effects had not reached national news. 
Madrigal’s (2019) historical ethnography underlines that the residents of Cananea 
have become habituated to the negative externalities of mining that are experienced 
daily, to the extent that they begin to normalize pollution as part of their lives and 
gradually begin to render these experiences positive. During fieldwork, informal 
chats with residents revealed that they considered the yellow-blueish coloring of the 
local stream pretty and that increasingly it was becoming something to highlight to 
visitors. Residents do not deny the contamination generated by mining, but instead 





Hegemony and its limitations for studying mining governance 
 
The introductory description in the previous section is relevant to flesh out the 
contribution of Gramscian hegemony in understanding local governance. I argue that 
the concept of hegemony is important in understanding power relations and their 
practices in Cananea and the Sonora River region. However, this approach faces 
limitations when encountering decentered relations that go beyond the state.  
 
In studying Mexican political economy, Gramscian hegemony has been applied to 
unpack the country’s capitalist power relations on different and across scales of 
action: international, national and regional (Hesketh, 2017; Morton, 2007; Rubin, 
1997). Hegemony is a dialectic concept built upon both coercion and consensus and 
the multiple forms that both mechanisms simultaneously entail to maintain dominant 
groups’ interests. Because capitalism is prone to crisis and contradictions, dominant 
groups cannot deliver consistently the promises announced in their consensual 
approach, generally observed through negotiations held to incorporate partially 
subaltern groups’ interests or demands. Therefore, hegemony is continuously 
resisted or challenged by subaltern groups.  Negotiation tactics are materialized in 
policies and programs which require state and civil society institutions to be rolled 
out and adopted by the popular sectors. The compound state-civil society is what 
Gramsci called the ‘integral state’. However, when negotiation fails, force tends to be 
used as the alternative to endure the dominant classes’ struggle for hegemony 




Power relations in Cananea have been studied through a Gramscian approach 
(Herner, 2001), because it has been a cradle of labor-rights struggles incorporated in 
the 1917 Mexican Constitution and because it represents the blurring of economic 
and political interests materialized through mining, which has helped nurture the 
country’s 21st century commodities boom and its association to the modernization 
discourse (Sariego, 2016). As discussed below, through consensual strategies, 
attempts to acculture the population of Cananea to accepting mining as the only 
alternative for development have been present. By focusing on Cananea and the 
Sonora River Region, this paper contributes to Morton’s (2013) call for a focus on 
space and multi-scalar relationships in order to understand and tackle the uneven 
geographical development of state power and its operation.   
 
However, a Gramscian approach is not enough to understand Cananea’s 
governance. The centrality of BdC specifically, and GpMx more generally, has 
revealed that the decentered nature of power from the state to other non-state 
actors, and in particular, to mining companies in modern enclave towns are 
important to consider (Smart, 2020). I argue that this decentered nature has been 
increasingly captured in the policies of CSR. As discussed below, the debates 
around the aspirations and limitations of CSR have been useful in identifying 
business’s contributions and operations of power, alongside the state (Hilson, 2012).  
 
Ekers and Loftus (2013: 18) are among several scholars who argue that a 
Gramscian method demands we define concepts in relation to historically and 
geographically situated practices, which may require the use of other intellectual 
traditions. These authors’ (2008) argument on the complementarity between 
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Gramsci’s hegemony and ideology and Foucault’s governmentality and power is 
useful to understand the decentered nature of power in governing arrangements. 
Based on Gramsci’s work, I am interested in the consensual arm of hegemony which 
focuses not on sanctions but on tactics to create deeper attachments to a way of 
thinking and acting, especially through policies and programs. Based on Foucault’s 
work, the diffusion of power through a social body of relations is relevant; in 
particular, relations between GpMx and the communities its mining activities impact, 
which materialize in administrative ‘practices that aim to control everyday life’ (Ekers 
and Loftus, 2008: 706).  
 
For Foucault (in Ekers and Loftus, 2008), daily discipline is not only centered on the 
state, but is also dispersed in practices and knowledge promoted and embodied by 
non-state actors, such as schools, prisons or hospitals. Hence, state and non-state 
actors constitute a network of relations that contribute to the basis of modern forms 
of rule; for these authors Foucault’s interpretation ‘might be seen to have 
antecedents in Gramsci’s work on the integral state’ (2008:704).  
 
The dispersion of governmental relations is key in understanding debates on network 
governance. These debates underline the blurred distinction between state, civil 
society and the business sector in the policy-making process. The state has become 
an interorganizational network made up of governmental and societal actors with no 
sovereign actor being able to steer or regulate them (Rhodes, 1997; Kooiman, 
2003). The elements of citizen and community participation in CSR debates are 
central to my argument, which in this decentered context, alludes to debates on 
policy-making encapsulated by network governance. Davies (2012:2688) argues that 
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network governance is a broad church term with ‘common reference points across 
social sciences’, but of importance in these debates is the ‘cultivation of networks 
between public authorities and other actors’ in order to reduce governing 
transactions costs between state, markets and societies through, albeit highly 
questionable relations of trust and collaboration that at times require hidden coercive 
tactics. 
 
These networks require management and coordination, which aim to be flexible and 
information rich (2012:2689). Davies argues that network governance can be 
understood as a form of Gramsci’s ‘integral state’ pursuing hegemony. With Foucault 
to help him, he also delves to bring Gramscian abstract theorizations down onto the 
local scale (Davies, 2014). In doing so, he recognizes that a Foucauldian approach 
has limitations on two important fronts, both of which are relevant to my argument: 
the inadequate theorization of the relationship between the coercive and non-
coercive execution of power and the inattention to scale, in particular, how power is 
configured in cities or municipalities (2014:3219) and in relation to national and 
international scales. In bringing together all these debates, this paper aims to 
underline the importance of Foucault’s governmentality without forgetting Gramsci’s 
insights, when studying local hegemony and its relationship with other spatial scales.   
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Corporate social responsibility as a vehicle for unpacking mining governance 
 
In mining, CSR policies have increasingly incorporated the term ‘sustainable mining’, 
which works as a vehicle of change that challenges the mining sector to rethink what 
regional and local development are (Antonelli, 2009). At its best, the interpretation of 
the term provides a more integrative approach, coupling the extraction of resources 
with human rights and community or citizen participation (vis-a-vis corruption and 
lack of transparency). Environmental sustainability is also pursued through 
management practices that allow the use of renewable natural resources to produce 
‘indispensable’ goods for human subsistence, while including long-term mitigation 
and compensation schemes for communities impacted negatively by extraction 
(Antonelli, 2009; Smart 2020).  
 
At its worst, sustainable mining can become a greenwashing tactic that accompanies 
other means for deflecting government regulation, while showcasing businesses’ 
moral commitments to wellbeing (Shamir, 2010; Vogel, 2010). The latter enables a 
common language for state, enterprises and communities to co-govern in the local 
policy-making of sustainable development, but rather more often subjecting social 
considerations to commercial ones. Shamir (2005) argues that CSR models 
commonly consist of community and educational training programs that swap ‘a 
rhetoric of political empowerment for a rhetoric of socioeconomic empowerment by 
educating and equipping people with skills and organizational tools’ for coping with 
unemployment, displacement and self-provision (Taylor in Shamir, 2005: 107). 
Although sustainable mining commitments are voluntary commitments, rewards for 
attaining them have become important. Good CSR policies do not guarantee more 
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valuable stock shares  for shareholders and investors, but provide instead risk 
management tools that enhance marketing, public, employee, and investor relations 
(Vogel, 2010: 77), especially as these shareholders are increasingly sympathizing 
with the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals.  
 
In studying the local scale, Davies (2012) argues that network governance, instead 
of only relying on trust among public officials, business leaders and community 
activists, can also be characterized by distrust. Therefore, it is important to pay more 
attention to the coercive side of consensus that network governance entails. To 
ensure political stability and to compensate for existing levels of distrust, he argues 
that consensual administrative domination and the replication of coercive and 
exclusionary practices require careful unpicking.  
 
The coercion-consensus dialectics is commonly found in processes of administrative 
domination, which are usually enacted by the state bureaucracy such as the 
magistracy, police, managers of urban space and housing, and regulatory functions 
of local authorities (2012: 2693), and I will argue  also through the bureaucracy of the 
corporation through CSR policies. Davies contends that the perpetrators of 
administrative domination obscure injustices by promoting participation and 
collaboration among state, businesses and communities, which in turn conceal the 
coercive domination of political-economic elites. Administrative domination is 
relevant for studying sustainable mining within local governance arrangements, 
especially when the mining corporations have had a strong influence in the 
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management of local space and citizen participation in periods of labor, 
environmental and identity conflicts. 
 
Garibay’s (2019) analysis on ‘negative reciprocity’ is helpful to apply Davies’ 
consensual coercion into mining governance. Garibay defines negative reciprocity as 
the intention of mining corporations to take everything while giving little or nothing in 
return. Corporations simulate a positive transaction, but under a model of 
domination, extraction of labor, goods and territory are obtained at a very low cost.  
Garibay argues that the main strategy of the Mexican business sector in 
implementing sustainable mining is the deployment of community development 
programs, encompassed by a CSR policy. Enterprises identify needs and aspirations 
of the community through participatory mechanisms to produce community 
development plans, which may include redress procedures and relocation of 
displaced groups as a result of mining expansion.  
 
However, Garibay continues, while, on the one hand, the enterprise is following the 
discourse of participation, consultation and perhaps deliberation with community 
groups in achieving an agreement that ‘favors’ the community’s wellbeing; on the 
other hand,  through the networks built in the mining sector, the enterprise lobbies 
state actors across multi-level tiers of government to promote: favorable legal  
conditions; subsidies to facilitate investment and  obtain incentives, licenses and 
permits; streamlining of administrative processes to appropriate land and resources 
(i.e. water); capture of state and community institutions through bribery and other 
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informal arrangements; or deactivation of any opposition to mining (i.e. aided by 
state policing and militarization) . 
 
Within these activities that Garibay enlists, I argue that participation is used as an 
instrumental process to help implement objectives of territorial expansion and risk 
management to which contemporary mining activities are exposed; however, the 
(mis)management of information and of participatory mechanisms are 
simultaneously required to ensure an administrative and (limited) regulatory 
environment for businesses to thrive. It is in the mismanagement of information and 
implementation of participatory arrangements by state and business actors at the 
local level that administrative domination can be identified and where coercion 




Administrative domination: a confluence of state and business practices 
 
The 2007 strike and 2014 spill undoubtedly prompted change in the policies and 
strategies carried out by GpMx, and at a micro-level, they are concessions that need 
to be made in striving for hegemony. Between 2009-2010, the Community 
Development Directorate (CDD) in the mining branch of GpMx was created. It has 
developed a humane approach in the building of relationships with communities 
directly impacted by mining, whilst also pursuing ‘good neighborliness’ through CSR. 
The CDD has invested in ‘good corporate citizen’ activities (Shamir, 2005) through 
community events, donations to local charities and community organizations and 
summer schools; but it was also found that the CDD has created ways of influencing 
local policy-making through participation embedded in the sustainable mining 
discourse.  
 
The CDD is a decentralized directorate from the technical and productive side of the 
corporation; it has created its own brand coined Casa Grande. It is no coincidence 
that its foundation was a strategy to build harmony in the relationships between the 
enterprise and the community, which experienced state repression back in 2007. 
The economic recession that the town encountered as a result of the mine’s closure 
over three years also added stress to the relationships between enterprise, 
community and local authorities. The program of activities lined up by Casa Grande 





In 2009, on behalf of Casa Grande, a roadmap of economic, political, social and 
environmental assessments was carried out by a small team of 
sociologists/anthropologists to build a diagnostic study of Cananea. This roadmap 
worked as evidence to design a program of activities through which Casa Grande 
could contribute to the development of community activism and social cohesion 
across different age groups in Cananea. In the early stages of the program, 
infrastructure projects with regard to building improvements were also financed, but 
through the introduction of the mining tax in 2014, these activities have only focused 
on social development projects. 
 
The program of activities stresses the importance of community skills, particularly 
leadership. Casa Grande considers itself a source of local leaders who have the 
vision to engage and promote ideas for Cananea’s ‘sustainable-mining’ 
development. The leadership program interweaves with some principles of citizen 
participation, particularly with inclusion, transparency and accountability. The latter is 
observed through the Communitarian Committee (CC-CG) which promotes and 
sponsors community groups’ social projects. The CC-CG is formed of between 8 and 
10 citizens. Initially they were appointed by GpMx and subsequently by a smaller 
network of community members. Members have a professional background (school-
teachers, doctors, etc.), they are well known residents and community activists. They 
also lack an immediate related past with mining workers in the low ranks. Casa 
Grande staff have designed processes where transparency and accountability are 
exercised by CC-CG through, for example, annual and regular meetings where CDD 
budget reports and business plans  are presented, discussed and monitored. 
However, the extent to which these processes are transparent and accountable to 
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the rest of the public was a moot point during the interviews (CC-CG members_020 
and 023, Cananea).   
 
After four years of restoring trust in the community, the spill disaster seriously 
questioned GpMx’s sustainability agenda. There is an environment directorate in 
GpMx which deals directly with environmental management issues. However, if 
sustainable mining is supposed to build links between environmental and social and 
participatory matters, then these links were scarce. Apart from close communication 
between the general directors of both divisions and joint CRS annual reports, a more 
interwoven program of activities was lacking. Instead, it was found that during the 
immediacy of the spill, Casa Grande began to organize immediately, bringing over 
extra staff from other parts of the country and providing drinking water to the victims. 
Over a three-month period, it surveyed the impact that many localities down the river 
were experiencing, it provided initial compensations to households directly affected, 
and coordinated the collection of information with academics, voluntary groups and 
government authorities. This work provided a baseline on which federal authorities 
began implementing the remedial plan (GpMx officers_005 and 010, Hermosillo). 
 
By the end of 2014, federal government took over the management of the remedial 
plan. Led by the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT), a 
private trust was created, Fideicomiso Río Sonora (Sonora River Trust, FRS). The 
Trust held the funds offered by GpMx, who was sanctioned with a Mex$2 million 
pesos remedial package. The implementation of the plan was led by state-
government and municipal authorities (Lamberti, 2018). The mismanagement of the 
funds and ineffectiveness in distributing resources by government authorities at 
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individual and community levels has been published in NGO-investigative reports 
(Fundar, 2018; Lamberti, 2018). Among the administrative deficiencies underlined by 
these reports are problems with complete, timely and open information; corruption in 
the distribution of compensations; underspend of the MX$2 million pesos; and lack of 
management capacity to operate water-purification plants and health services. GpMx 
had no direct responsibility in the management and operation of the remedial plan, 
but municipal authorities, who partnered with state and federal agencies, did. 
Surprisingly, no signs of Casa Grande influencing how participation could have made 
the FRS more transparent and accountable were identified in fieldwork, despite the 
fact that the lack of information, transparency and social accountability were the 
main problems addressed in the criticisms of the mismanagement handled by FRS. 
If Casa Grande was serious in tackling these democratic shortfalls, why did it not 
suggest participatory solutions to the criticisms raised?  
 
Despite the partial delivery of the commitments agreed, the FRS closed in 2017. As 
a result, Casa Grande decided to invest resources in Cananea and the Sonora River 
region by funding the consultancy services of academics to help Rio Sonora 
municipalities develop comprehensive municipal development plans. This decision 
illustrates how Casa Grande’s tentacles extend in policy-making and which are 
enhanced by the federal creation of a mining tax, colloquially known as Fondo 
Minero (Mining Fund, FM). Up until 2019, the FM aimed to reinvest the tax paid by 
mining companies into the states and municipalities where minerals were extracted, 
80% of the collection was directed to earmarked social infrastructures which ranged 
from basic (urban) to more sophisticated infrastructures to improve water and air 




Sonora State is the biggest beneficiary of this tax given its mining productivity, and 
Cananea was the municipality in all Sonora which obtained the largest amounts of 
the tax in 2017-18. [5]. The substantial revenue that Cananea received from the FM 
became an unprecedented opportunity for state-government and municipal 
authorities to begin strategizing tax distribution and implementation. The first 
municipal administration that benefited from this resource was the Herrera 
administration (2015-2018). In the first two years of this administration the FM was 
invested in road infrastructure. By 2017, 40% of Cananea’s FM budget was allocated 
to participatory budgeting, entitled ‘Cananea tu decides’ (Cananea you decide, 
CTD).  
 
Participatory budgeting has become the World Bank’s flagship of participation under 
a managerial rubric of transparency and accountability for local governments to 
reduce patronage and corruption, and from the early-2000s, it has fed ‘good 
governance’ understandings (Goldfrank, 2012). CTD was coupled with ideas of 
citizen inclusion and associated with the broader discourse on transparency pursued 
by both municipal and federal governments. The 13 projects voted for by citizens 
prioritized basic infrastructure, such as street tarmac, piped water and sewerage 
connections or street electrification. The number of infrastructure projects was 
notable; it more than doubled the investment that the previous two administrations 
together carried out.  Interviews with residents (025 and 027, Cananea) and 
municipal authorities (senior politician_011 and finance officer_013, Cananea) 
underlined how this exercise created a space to begin trusting the municipal 
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administration after citizen consultations materialized in the construction of needed 
public works. 
 
Although Casa Grande had no direct role in the design, management and allocation 
of resources that derived from participatory budgeting, during the first three years of 
the FM implementation, the head of CDD was the representative of the mining sector 
in the regional committee at state-level government. This committee ensured that the 
FM was spent according to municipal authority plans. The CDD’s role in this regional 
committee can be interpreted as a tactical step by GpMx to understand how far its 
tax influenced not only the design and monitoring of fiscal monies, but also municipal 
governance decisions in infrastructure. In this sense, GpMx benefited from the 
infrastructural precarity that was present across different scales – neighborhood, 
municipality, region – and which complemented the broader national discourse on 
extractive industries as engines of modernization. 
 
Mining town companies have had an incredible presence in the identity formation of 
place. This is a general characteristic that has been developed historically by all 
mine owners in Cananea (Harner, 2001), but it cannot be ignored that Casa Grande 
has added value in striving for a local hegemonic rule over the past decade as a 
response to the labor and environmental crises. Harner argues that Gramscian 
hegemony is present in Cananea through a continuous quest for an equilibrium, in 
which ‘the meaning of place for the majority of residents matches the ideological 
beliefs of the class in power [GpMx and politicians]’ (2001:676).  In this sense, Casa 
Grande has contributed to hegemonic formation through the promotion of citizen 
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participation that expands across different dimensions: from its Communitarian 
Committee and sponsored projects, through its corporate citizen activities, to its 
support for participatory budgeting.  
 
However, the participatory spaces Casa Grande creates lack the emancipatory 
values that democratic participation in principle entail, because the skills acquired in 
privately and publicly-led participations are subject to a market rationale. In fieldwork, 
observations of the summer activities offered to young people and in the criteria 
used to assess community projects receiving Casa Grande’s financial and in-kind 
support, it was noticed that emancipatory training would have included awareness of 
human rights, exercises to build collective identity and social cohesion between rival 
groups as well as exercises to identify the community’s limitations and fears with 
regard to quality of water. But instead, Casa Grande promoted individual leadership 
through exercises that nurtured aspirational and self-esteem activities and 
commitment towards others. The opportunity to develop this through CSR has been 
an attractive way to develop counter tactics to evade and co-opt, what Shamir (2005) 
calls, ‘unwarranted political pressures’ created by more combative  groups such as 







The following paragraphs analyze how administrative domination is embedded in a 
threefold strategy carried out jointly by GpMx and different state actors; it is 
composed of policy distancing, legitimacy control, and concealed coercion.  
 
Distancing from policy responsibility 
In both NGO reports and during our interviews,  questions arose about the fulfillment 
of the compensations carried out by GpMx with regard to FRS and the disaster 
victims and the limited encounters and negotiations held with the SNTMMSSRM in 
the aftermath of the strike through the Federal Council of Conciliation and Arbitration 
(015_union member, Cananea).  In analyzing the data, it was found that the common 
tactic that the corporation uses is that of stepping back and leaving responsibility to 
state actors to negotiate the terms and delivery of the compensations agreed. In 
order to carry out the latter, GpMx builds a series of relationships with all kinds of 
state authorities to negotiate terms that are convenient to the mining division of the 
corporation. At federal level our data underlined SEMARNAT and other ministries, 
including Work and Social Prevention (STPS), Agriculture and Rural Development 
(SAGARPA), Interior (SEGOB), Agrarian, Territorial and Urban Development 
(SEDATU), and Federal Police; at state level with the governor and the Ministry of 
Economy, and at municipal level, the relationship was primarily built with mayors. 
The relationships with government agencies are used as a shield to cover GpMx 
from having direct contact with affected citizen groups. Ironically, this type of practice 





The stepping-back tactic creates a distant and ‘closed’ image of GpMx.  This image 
has helped to find ways for buying time to prolong judicial procedures that detach the 
corporation from its social responsibility. For example, in the amparo (ref. 144/2015) 
originally submitted by PODER, GpMx was considered the responsible authority for 
violating human rights as a result of the damage caused by the spill. However, state-
level judicial authorities declined such claim. PODER considered this resolution 
biased as judicial authorities favored decisions that gave more time to GpMx to 
ponder a counter action to undermine the lawsuit (PODER, 2018). In this sense, it 
can be argued that GpMx treats government authorities as the janitor charged with 
doing the ‘undesirable’ work of dealing with organized citizens. It is government 
authorities who liaise, albeit in many cases ineffectively, with citizens’ demands and 
it is they who are directly accused by the general public as being corrupt. Meanwhile, 
GpMx is exonerated of any wrongdoing, expressing contempt for government 
agencies’ incapacity to ‘put its house in order’ to resolve citizen needs effectively. 
This contempt is reflected, for example, in GpMx’s withdrawal of financial support to 
the FRS, especially when the latter could not solve problems effectively due to its 
administrative negligence in constructing and operating the epidemiological clinic to 
treat victims affected by the spill (UN, 2017:10).  
 
Interestingly, the creation of the CDD-Casa Grande alongside the CSR policy has 
helped to overcome some of the faults that the distant and closed position of GpMx 
has created. Casa Grande aims to bring the corporation closer to the community 
through a program of activities that can be interpreted as opportunities for the 
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community to learn to self-develop and self-manage in contexts of public service 
withdrawal and closure of social services. As structural reforms have consolidated in 
the country, Casa Grande has plugged the void. These self-management and 
participative community activities can be read as GpMx’s strategy to train Cananea’s 
inhabitants to manage their own needs, while ensuring that in the long-term they do 
not demand from the corporation free basic services, as they once did when the 
mine was state-owned. But equally these practices may help the community to cope 
with government agencies’ negligence regarding service provision.  Locally, these 
agencies have been perceived as corrupt and, until participatory budgeting was 
implemented, unaccountable to citizens. In this sense, GpMx helps to create a 
participatory culture in the governance of Cananea, and this extends the managerial 
rubric of participation whilst ensuring that no direct responsibility for the decisions 
taken during implementation is charged to the corporation.  
 
Legitimacy through urban-space and service-provision control 
On the one hand, alongside the municipal government, Casa Grande has helped to 
prepare Cananea’s application as Pueblo Mágico (Magic Town - a national 
recognition for towns that stand out for their beauty and customs) and to diversify 
Cananea’s economy beyond mining through the support of wine production 
initiatives. Environmental projects have also been used to build a positive image. For 
example, the leisure park and shopping center Plaza Tamosura and the co-
maintenance of the reserve federal park, known as the UMA. These quasi-private 
spaces are thought to compensate for the closure of public spaces such as the Ojo 
de Agua, a natural reserve bought by BdC to supply water to its mining activities. 
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Another example is the CDD’s project to promote trade of the regional farming 
produce of the Sonora River, whose lowlands were affected by the spill (CDD 
officer_036, Mexico City). These activities are complemented by other isolated 
projects in which GpMx’s logo is seen in billboards and street furniture, showing that 
the corporation is involved in the construction of roads and highways and street 
maintenance of those municipalities along the river, which do not benefit from the 
FM. Through these types of activities, the CDD wants to show residents that the 
corporation generates a positive impact and that it cares. 
 
On the other hand, Casa Grande has not shown interest in tackling issues that are 
relevant for a significant part of the population. It has not invested in reviving spaces 
in Cananea Vieja, which several residents claim built their identity.  Nor has it found 
ways to help arrange independent, rigorous and open surveys about residents’ 
preoccupations and perceptions regarding water scarcity and its quality and health 
services, which could influence local policies to address the management of natural 
resources in a transparent way. Anyone who visits Cananea and the river 
municipalities for a few weeks will realize that the architecture of the historic center 
and water scarcity are two of the population’s main worries.  
 
CDD staff (005 and 036, Hermosillo and Mexico City) claim that the program of 
activities they have been developing since 2009 in Cananea and since 2017 along 
the Sonora River responds to the socio-economic roadmap and diagnoses carried 
out by the corporation and which in theory include the populations’ needs, worries 
and demands. Unfortunately, these reports are not publicly available as the 
29 
 
corporation’s confidentiality must be respected. One inevitably questions why Casa 
Grande’s program of activities has not addressed more openly these aspects that 
are relevant to the majority of the population. A possible answer may be that by 
addressing these issues, Casa Grande will contribute to reducing GpMx’s legitimacy. 
In our sojourns of the city, one of the town’s historians mentioned that GpMx is not 
‘really interested’ in reviving the historic center. Doing so, would mean ‘surrender to 
residents-workers who associate their identity with living and feeling’ the city 
(fieldwork notes).  
 
Concealed coercion  
The CDD has helped to conceal, but only to a limited extent, the corporation’s 
coercive arm, as experienced in the 2007 strike. The latter left a precedent in the 
community as union workers and families confronted militarized police protecting the 
mine’s premises. Repression (beating and tear gas) was used to control and disrupt 
street protests. After the violent conflict, BdC decided to build barricades and iron 
gates at all the entrances to the site. These entrances are closely guarded by private 
security and at different times by militarized police. The water wells found in the rural 
districts are all fenced, but Los Patos is the most secure and surveilled. One of the 
roads connecting Cananea to southern municipalities has armed guards and all car 
drivers must give their names while their license plates are checked. These guards, 
gates and fences intimidate the pedestrians and cars passing by. We were warned 
by participants to be discrete in taking pictures as we could be questioned and if we 





Participants mentioned a black-list containing the names of workers actively involved 
in the 2007 protests and related activities carried out over time. These workers 
cannot work in BdC or in other mining sites owned by GpMx, including secondary or 
tertiary firms to whom BdC outsources services. On some occasions, extended 
family members have also been affected by the black-list. For example, we found 
that the niece of a former worker, who required practical training in mining 
engineering as part of her local college studies, was denied access to BdC and had 
to travel to Chihuahua State to undertake training. 
 
Meanwhile, inside the mining site we were told during informal conversations and by 
Branch 65 interviewees (021 and 022, Cananea) who have colleagues working in the 
site that tactics of labor control are being carried out.  Shifts are now of 12 hours (up 
from 8 hours back in 2007), workers are continuously monitored to discourage them 
from gathering in groups, and at the entrance they are asked to leave their personal 
belongings, including smart phones, to avoid rumors about  labor rights violations 
being spread through social media.  
 
The 2014 disaster has left resentment among the population affected as they 
interpret the corporation’s absenteeism as abandonment over the three years in 
which the FRS was implementing the remedial program. The misinformation and 
mismanagement of the Trust was interpreted by some residents as a clear indication 
of how GpMx and government authorities ‘can beat, step on and forget you’. 
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Resentment is accompanied by the uncertainty communities have in using tap water, 
because of the distrust they have about official verbal announcements that the water 
is not contaminated. As a result, residents along the Sonora River now buy 20-liter 
plastic containers of purified water; the new cost adds to the general memory of 
injustices that GpMx and government’s structural policies inflicted upon Cananea’s 
residents after the mine’s privatization.  
 
The coercive tactics of GpMx have been accompanied by federal state intervention 
in repressing the 2007 strike and road blockages in 2018 and more broadly through 
the surveillance of individuals, streets and highways. The latter is coupled with a 
wider national program of drug-trafficking control which is accentuated on the US-
Mexico border. ‘Mafia-like’ disciplinary tactics are not absent either. On one 
occasion, we were told of rural residents being threatened by the local mafia after 
they complained to BdC about its breach of the water contract signed with the 
agrarian assembly (assembly member_024, Cananea). Likewise, a couple of 
academics we approached were not keen to share information because of fear of 
intimidation by GpMx.  These coercive tactics not only categorize resistance as 
conflict and manipulate participation, but also mismanage information to create fear, 






The threefold strategy -policy distancing, legitimacy through control, and concealed 
coercion- carried out by GpMx shows how administrative domination is implemented 
at the everyday level. This administrative domination requires the aid of a wide range 
of state actors and a clear directorate in charge of implementing CSR policies, which 
in turn interweaves with government programs and projects, such as participatory 
budgeting. However, this threefold strategy  functions through a series of 
contradictions in order to maintain hegemony: mismanaging information while 
creating spaces of citizen participation; distancing from political responsibility while 
opening spaces of rapprochement through Casa Grande’s activities; promoting the 
city’s beauty but neglecting its historical buildings; closing public spaces while 
opening quasi-private parks. It is important to note how all the latter contradictions 
have contributed to concealing repressive coercion, yet it appears that in the last 
instance coercive tactics, with aid of state actors, are used to maintain domination  
Although it was not the focus of this paper, hegemony, in a Gramscian sense, is 
always contested, and in this sense the threefold strategy has responded to the 
pressures put by the mining union and grassroots resistance against the violation of 
labor and environmental rights.  
 
By unpacking administrative domination, the paper has shown the usefulness of a 
Foucauldian approach in the everyday execution of power diffusion through a social 
body of relations, which has been built by GpMx, different state actors and local civil 
society/citizen groups. In centering the analysis on network governance, the concept 
of hegemony was applied at the local level, which helped unpack the coercive and 
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non-coercive execution of power This exercise would not have been possible without 
building links back to Gramscian foci on historicity, spatial scales and the coercion-
consensus dialectics in which hegemony has been embedded in Mexican mining.  
 
The paper also underlined that as the mining industry expands and intensifies, so 
does its influence in local policy-making, especially in countries with limited 
regulatory environments. Beyond the cases discussed here, there are several mining 
towns in Mexico which may encounter a similar trend in their local governance, to 
mention a few: Necozari and La Colorada in Sonora State, Sombrerete in Zacatecas 
State and Cerro San Pedro in San Luis Potosí State. Beyond Mexico, there are 
several emblematic cases in Latin America (see examples covered in the books 
edited by Rodríguez López, 2016). This paper has shown the relevance of 
emphasizing the limitations of network governance which merit further research, 
especially on the implications of distrust and limited accountability that stem from the 
local level and that can be found in CSR policies. However, if care is not taken, CSR 
can divert attention away from the shortfalls of administrative domination -
mismanagement of information and unempowering participation- which sadly 
contribute to the development of a sclerotic state. Ironically, the CDD-Casa Grande’s 
adoption of participatory mechanisms highlights the precarious role that municipal 
government has had and indirectly underlines the weak role of the municipality in 
Mexico’s democratization. Three decades ago, municipal authorities were 
considered engines of democratic and participative innovation; but with the 
expansion of the extractive industry it seems that this role has been forgotten and 
instead has passed, by default, to the corporation. If academics and practitioners 
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continue overlooking this shift, the empowering principles inherent in the concept of 




1. The Sonora River Region is comprised of seven municipalities located to the 
south of Cananea: Arizpe, Banámichi, Huepac, San Felipe de Jesús, Aconchi, 
Baviácora and Ures. 
2. Interviews were conducted with 9 government officers; 4 business sector 
individuals; 3 union members; 3 NGO officers, 3 local journalists and activists; 
6 local residents; and 7 academics. Interviews were coded from 000 to 038. 
The strong conflict between different stakeholders required the author to 
maintain anonymity. 
3. Data can be consulted in the Sonora River Trust monthly monitoring reports 
between 2014 and 2015 - www.fideicomisoriosonora.gob.mx/monitoreo.html  -
Accessed 5 May 2019 
4. This ruling was important as communities discovered in 2015 that BdC had 
plans to build a new 8km long tailings dam, equivalent in size to 4,158 football 
fields - www.animalpolitico.com/2019/05/sonora-presa-consulta-grupo-
mexico/ - Accessed 3 July 2019 
5. In 2017, 18% of the Mining Fund was directed to Sonora State (ca MX$690 
million received out of a total of MX$3,700 million). Cananea received 
MX$283 million, equivalent to 40% - www.gob.mx/sedatu/acciones-y-
programas/fondo-minero-para-el-desarrollo-regional-sustentable - Accessed 






Antonelli, Mirta A.  
2010 “Minería transnacional y dispositivos de inversión en la cultura: La gestión del 
paradigma hegemónico de la ‘minería responsable y el desarrollo sustentable’”, pp. 
51-100 in Maristella Svampa and Mirta A. Antonelli (eds). Minería transnacional, 
narrativas del desarrollo y resistencias sociales. Buenos Aires: Biblos.  
Bebbington, Anthony, Denise Humphrys Bebbington, Jeffrey Bury, Jeanette Lingan, 
Juan Pablo Munoz, and Martin Scurrah 
2008 “Mining and social movements: struggles of livelihood and territorial 
development in the Andes”, World Development, 36(12), 2888-905. 
Bebbington, Anthony, Benjamin Fash and John Rogan 
2019 “Socio-environmental conflict, political settlements, and mining governance”, 
Latin American Perspectives, 46(2), pp.84-106.  
Coelho, Vera Shattan P. and Arilson Favareto 
2008 “Questioning the relationships between participation and development: A case 
study of the Vale do Ribeira, Brazil”, World Development, 36(12), 2937-2956 
Davies, Jonathan S.  
2012 “Network Governance Theory: A Gramscian critique”, Environment and 
Planning A, 44, pp.2687-2704. 
2014 “Rethinking urban power and the local state: Hegemony, domination and 
resistance in neoliberal cities, Urban Studies, 51(15), pp.3215-3232. 
Ekers, Michael and Alex Loftus  
37 
 
2008 “The power of water: developing dialogues between Foucault and Gramsci”, 
Environment and Planning D, 26, pp. 698-718. 
2013 “Gramsci: Space, Nature and Politics”, pp.15-44 in Michael Ekers et al. (eds.) 
Gramsci: Space, Nature and Politics. Oxford: John Wiley & Sons. 
Fundar (Fundar: Centro de Análisis e Investigación) 
2018 Fideicomisos en México. El arte de desaparecer dinero público, Fundar, 
Centro de Análisis e Investigación https://fundar.org.mx/fideicomisos-en-mexico-el-
arte-de-desaparecer-dinero-publico/ [accessed 14 June 2019] 
Grindle, Merilee 
2007 Going Local: Decentralization, democratization and the promise of good 
governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Garibay Orozco, Claudio 
2019 “Clúster minero global, instauración de horizontes de coerción y resistencias 
en las sociedades locales de México”, pp. 165-214 in Leticia Durand et al. (eds.) 
Naturaleza y capitalismo. Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México,. 
Harner, John 
2001 “Place Identity and Copper Mining in Sonora, Mexico”, Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, 91(4), pp. 660-680. 
INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía) 
2015 
http://cuentame.inegi.org.mx/monografias/informacion/son/territorio/div_municipal.as




2017 Spaces of Capital/Spaces o Resistance: Geographies of Justice and Social 
Transformation, Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press 
Hilson, Gavin 
2012 “Corporate Social Responsibility in the Extractive Inudstries: Experiences from 
developing countries, Resources Policy, 37, pp. 131-137.  
Kooiman, Jan 
2003 Governing as Governance. London: Sage Publications 
Lamberti, Julieta 
2018 “Análisis del Fideicomiso Río Sonora. Simulando la remediación privada en un 
estado capturado”, https://www.colaboratorio.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/analisis-FRS.pdf, [accessed July 2018]. 
Madrigal, David 
2019 “De la práctica antropológica en contextos de negación de conflicto: 
aproximaciones etnográficas a los derrames mineros en México” pp. 235-160, in 
José Luis Plata, Alejandro Vázquez and David Madrigal (eds.) Experiencias de 
exploración y práctica antropológica: Querétaro, San Luis Potosí y otras latitudes. 
San Luis Potosí, Mex.: Colegio de San Luis. 
Meza, Oliver D. 
2018 “Policy analysis in local governments: an exploration of an institutional 
governance model”, pp. 147-168 in Jose Luis Mendez and Mauricio I. Dusssauge-




2013 “Traveling with Gramsci: The spatiality of passive revolution”, pp.47-64 in 
Michael Ekers et al. (eds.) Gramsci: Space, Nature and Politics. Oxford: John Wiley 
& Sons. 
Rhodes, Rod A.W.  
1996 “The New Governance. Governing without Government”, Political Studies, 
44(4), pp. 652-667. 
Rubin, Jeffrey W. 
Decentering the Regime: Ethnicity, radicalism and democracy in Juchitan, Mexico. 
Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 
Sariego, Juan Luis 
2013 “La interminable huelga de los mineros mexicanos de Cananea: ¿El fin de un 
régimen laboral?” Amérique Latine Histoire et Mémoire. Les Cahiers ALHIM [Online], 
http://journals.openedition.org/alhim/4789 [accessed August 2018]. 
2016 “Extractivismo y sustentabilidad: La conflictividad actual en la minería 
mexicana”, pp. 21-67 in Abel Rodríguez Lopez (ed.) Sociedades mineras en 
América Latina: Homenaje a Juan Luis Sariego Rodríguez, part 1. Mexico: Instituto 
Nacional de Antropología e Historia.   
Shamir, Ronen 
2005 “Corporate Social Responsibility: A case of hegemony and counter-hegemony”, 
pp. 82-118 in Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Cesar A. Rodríguez Garavito (eds.) 
Law and Globalization from Below. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
40 
 
2010 “Capitalism, Governance, and Authority: The case of corporate social 
responsibility”, Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 6, pp. 531-553 
Smart, Sebastian  
2020 “The political economy of Latin American conflicts over mining extractivism”, 
Extractive Industries and Society, online publication Feb. 2020 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2020.02.004, pp. 1-13. 
Soy Cobre 
2018 “Mineros de la Secc. 65 seguirán su lucha ante JFCA y ante la CIDH”, 
www.soycobre.com/2018/01/mineros-de-la-secc-65-seguiran-su-lucha-ante-jfca-y-
ante-la-cidh/  [accessed 14 June 2019] 
SNTMMSSRM (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros, Metalúrigocs, 
Siderúrgicos y Similares de la República Mexicana) 
2015 “Boletín Informativo”, no. 6, marzo 2015,  
www.sindicatominero.org.mx/pdf/boletines/MINEROS_2015_006.pdf [accessed 14 
June 2019] 
Svampa, Maristella 
 2018 “Latin American Development: Perspectives and Debates”, in Tulia Falleti and 
Emilio A. Parrado (eds.) Latin American since the Left Turn. Pennsylvania: Penn 
Press, pp. 13-32. 
PODER (Project on Organizing, Development, Education and Research) 
2018 “Derrame de 40 millones de litros de solución de cobre acidulado en los ríos 
Bacanuchi y Sonora provenientes de las instalaciones de la mina Buenavista del 
41 
 
Cobre S.A. de C.V. subsidiaria de Grupo México, Informe para el Relator Especial 
sobre las obligaciones de derechos humanos relaciones con la gestión y eliminación 
ecológicamente racionales de las sustancias y los desechos peligrosos, Sr. Baskut 
Tunacak”, https://www.colaboratorio.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/informepararelator-DT.pdf (accessed 15 July 2019). 
Tetreault, Darcy 
2019 “Resistance to Canadian mining projects in Mexico: lessons from the lifecycle 
of the San Xavier Mine in San Luis Potosí”, Journal of Political Ecology, 26, pp. 85-
104.  
UN (United Nations) 
2017 “Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises on its mission to Mexico”, UN General 
Assembly Human Rights Council, 6-13 June 2017, A/HRC/35/32/Add.2 
UNDP (United Nations Development Program) 
2016 “Mapping Mining to the Sustainable Development Goals: An Atlas, 
United Nations Development Program” 
www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/mapping-mining-
to-the-sdgs--an-atlas.html [accessed June 2019] 
Vogel, David 
2010 “The private regulation of global corporate conduct: achievements and 
limitations”, Business and Society, 49(1), pp.68-87. 
Zaremberg, Gisela and Marcela Torres Wong 
42 
 
2018 “Participation on the Edge: Prior Consultation and Extractivism in Latin 
America”, Journal of Politics in Latin America, 3, pp. 29–58. 
 
